Tag: abortion

Blog Posts (69)

September 19, 2016

Late Term Zika Abortions: Thankfully not Euthanasia

If I were the editor of a recent Newsweek article by Cornell Law Professor Sherry F. Colb, the above title would have been my choice for her article. I must encourage you to read the actual article, lest you believe that the summary that follows is somehow taken grossly out of context. Her concern is that a late term abortion to terminate the life of... // Read More »
September 7, 2016

Positive rights and the tyranny of political power

Thanks go to Jon Holmlund for making us aware of the “Consensus Statement on Conscientious Objection in Healthcare” written by Julian Savulescu and a like-minded group of philosophers and ethicists. The statement, which represents one extreme in the discussion of rights of conscience and not a consensus of all those involved in this issue, seeks to transform negative rights into positive rights. That is, they... // Read More »
September 2, 2016

Evil on its Face

In June of this year, a group of ethicists—should I say that I use that term loosely?—issued a “consensus statement” to guide legislation and institutional policy regarding conscientious objection in medicine.  Conscientious objection, they explained, “is the refusal to provide a certain medical service, for example an abortion or medical assistance in dying, because it conflicts with the practitioner’s moral views.”  Their words, not mine.... // Read More »
July 28, 2016

Two of the week’s news items

1)      In this week when Hillary Clinton has declared the Hyde Amendment in her gun-sight, and said that “religious objections to abortion must change,” while her party literally shouts the confident claim that abortion is an affirmative public good and a fundamental human right, a commentator flagged the Washington Post’s awarding, last October, of 3 “Pinnochios” to the claim that Planned Parenthood ‘provides’ mammograms—a canard... // Read More »
July 6, 2016

The Strange (Future) Case of Doctors & Mr. Hyde

On 28 June 2016, the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of a Ninth Circuit decision that forced a small pharmacy in Washington to dispense Plan B (a “morning after pill” that terminates a pregnancy via abortion) despite the religious objections of the pharmacist owners. In other words, the lower court ruled that the pharmacists must violate their conscience by prescribing Plan B or... // Read More »
July 6, 2016

The Strange (Future) Case of Doctors & Mr. Hyde

On 28 June 2016, the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of a Ninth Circuit decision that forced a small pharmacy in Washington to dispense Plan B (a “morning after pill” that terminates a pregnancy via abortion) despite the religious objections of the pharmacist owners. In other words, the lower court ruled that the pharmacists must violate their conscience by prescribing Plan B or... // Read More »
July 1, 2016

Information overload

Alvin Toffler has died.  If you are too young to remember his 1970 book Future Shock (all of us nerdy kids in my school read it when it came out), one of his many prescient statements was that people in the future would be so overwhelmed with information that they scarcely know what to do with it all. And so in recent weeks I find... // Read More »
June 26, 2016

Pain-Capable Abortion Bans

More than three decades ago, I went to visit a friend who was hospitalized at NIH in Bethesda, Maryland. On the way from the parking lot to her room, I encountered a group of animal rights activists protesting the use of animals in medical research. To this day I vividly remember the chant they repeated again and again: “A cat is a rat is a... // Read More »
June 20, 2016

The Politics of Fetal Pain: Why This Is Not A Legislative Issue

I read with interest the recent blog by my colleagues Paul Burcher and Claire Horner entitled “The Politics of Fetal Pain”. In their blog they discuss the recent fetal pain bill passed in Utah, which “requires the use of general anesthesia on women seeking abortions at 20 weeks gestation or later.” At stake is the concern that fetuses may be capable of experiencing pain by 20 weeks, which has prompted 12 states to restrict or prohibit abortions from that point on, instead of 24 weeks, which is the current standard.

Burcher and Horner remind us that the issue of fetal pain has been a source of contention for some time, which has led to “several states restricting or prohibiting abortions 20 weeks or later on the basis of potential fetal pain.” The authors are very much aware of the possibility that anti-abortion advocates may be using this issue as a convenient means by which to place additional limits on abortion rights of women. Which is to say, anti-abortion advocates supporting these restrictions on women’s reproductive rights may be using the fetal pain issue as a means to restrict abortion rights. Even if they do have a bias in creating this law, Burcher and Horner still believe that the law itself is justified.

Though I would share a concern about the possibility of fetal pain, if I had reason to believe there were evidence to support it, I disagree that the appropriate next move ethically is to join forces with a legislative agenda of politicians whose interests go far beyond the issue of fetal pain. My worry is that such legislative actions in fact usurp the professional role of physicians as medical experts of scientific data to set appropriate standards for medical care.

I accept that the possibility of fetal pain at 20 weeks is a theoretical possibility. But to the extent I find such a claim plausible I would do so by placing my confidence in scientific evidence, which to date is questionable. The paper from which Burcher and Horner take their evidence about fetal pain comes from an author who makes it clear in his writing that he believes abortion is an act of unjust killing. This is not an unreasonable moral position nor does it mean that he is not accurate in his assessment of the medical and scientific evidence regarding fetal pain. But it does raise concerns about his ability to assess and write about data of fetal pain without bias. Is he following the evidence or is he interpreting the evidence to support his preexisting moral views? The answer is we just don’t know, in the same way we don’t know if the Utah state legislature is really concerned about the possibility of fetal pain beginning at 20 weeks or is their real goal to place additional restrictions on abortions?

I want to make it clear that people, including bioethicists, legislators, and the public at large, have every right to advocate, based on their understanding of the evidence, to ensure that fetuses do not suffer during abortions from 20 weeks and beyond. My only point is that such advocacy should not be expressed in laws that impose standards of care on how physicians practice medicine. Such advocates may retort, but why should I think that the medical profession or the scientific community is unbiased? Could it be the case that these professional bodies are abdicating their professional, moral obligations to reduce the possibility of human suffering? Of course that is a theoretical possibility. But in an era where the role of science is grossly misunderstood and under attack by many advocacy groups, those of us in bioethics must champion the standards of scientific research and judgment by medical professionals to produce evidence that is unbiased and reflects the best available understanding of important empirical questions, such as, can fetuses feel pain? This is not an ethical question, i.e. it has nothing to do with whether or not fetuses have moral standing as human beings—rather the question is purely a matter of getting the facts as clear as possible in determining at what point in the development of a human fetus is there a physiological basis for experiencing pain. This is exclusively the scientific issue about which scientific and medical experts must decide based on the best available evidence.

So where should we look for such an understanding of the data on fetal pain? The answer is we should rely on the experts on such matters as reflected in the opinion from the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), which concluded “fetal perception of pain is unlikely before the third trimester. Although ultrasound monitoring can show intrauterine fetal movement, no studies since 2005 demonstrate fetal recognition of pain.”

I hasten to make it clear that it is always possible current scientific opinions will need to be revised based on new data. There are many examples that bear out this point. But we should realize just how procedurally disruptive and even iconoclastic it is to impose standards legislatively onto medicine because, in effect, we don’t trust or have faith in the integrity of medical experts to be fair or unbiased themselves. For doing so indicts the institution within our democratic system whose defined role and responsibility is to be the arbiters of empirical disputes. The process, i.e. the scientific method they use is by definition one that has the least chance of bias. And without robust confidence in the scientific enterprise and the knowledge that is generated, bioethics loses its footing to make moral assessments and judgments. Thus I agree with the view of ACOG:

“Sound health policy is best based on scientific fact and evidence-based medicine. The best health care is provided free of governmental interference in the patient-physician relationship. Personal decision making by women and their doctors should not be replaced by political ideology.”

Committing ourselves to make decisions based on scientific evidence, both in individual cases and at the policy level, requires us to always stipulate that our knowledge today may not be getting things exactly right. Advocates for the possibility of fetal pain, and I may be one of them, should not be quiet. They have every right and perhaps an obligation to express their concerns. But to conclude that ACOG refuses to accept the possibility of fetal pain because of politics—the fear of having to possibly create new standards about which they may fear a backlash from prochoice advocates or that they really do not believe a fetus has full moral standing—is to lose trust and confidence in an essential democratic institution, and indeed risks becoming cynical and riding roughshod over the role of professional medical expertise.

Thus, I conclude the Utah bill was not an appropriate action for the legislature to take, even if there is eventually scientific evidence that supports their concerns. I understand that there are some medical concerns about which a state legislature may appropriately pass laws—assisted suicide or narcotics—if there is a clear and compelling public interest. But I submit, since there is no clear and compelling evidence, the issue of fetal pain is not one of them.

The Alden March Bioethics Institute offers a Master of Science in Bioethics, a Doctorate of Professional Studies in Bioethics, and Graduate Certificates in Clinical Ethics and Clinical Ethics Consultation. For more information on AMBI's online graduate programs, please visit our website.

June 10, 2016

Testing, testing: Prenatal genetic screening

The June 2016 issue of Obstetrics and Gynecology includes a study of the conversations between patients and “Health Care Providers” about prenatal genetic screening (PGS). The objective of the study was to “assess how obstetric health care providers counsel patients regarding prenatal genetic screening and how these conversations influence patients’ screening decisions.” PGS refers to blood and ultrasound tests performed early in pregnancy to determine... // Read More »